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Abstract 
The disaster myopia hypothesis is a theoretical argument that may explain why crises are a recurrent 
event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant information concerning 
the increasing degree of risk. Agents’ propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes 
from the distant past increases the longer the period since that event occurred and at some point the 
subjective probability attached to this event reaches zero. This risky behaviour may contribute to the 
formation of a bubble that bursts into a crisis. This paper tests whether there is evidence of disaster 
myopia during the recent episode of financial crisis in the banking sector. Its contribution is twofold. 
First, it shows that the 2007 financial crisis exhibits disaster myopia in the banking sector. And 
second, it identifies macro and specific determinant variables in banks’ risk taking since the beginning 
of the years 2000.   
 
JEL Classification: G01, G21, C23. 
Key-words: disaster myopia, financial crisis, banks, risk taking dynamics, GMM.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
The disaster myopia hypothesis has been introduced by Guttentag and Herring (1986) to explain why 
crises are a recurrent event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant 
information concerning the increasing degree of risk. Agents’ propensity to underestimate the 
probability of adverse outcomes from the distant past increases the longer the period since that event 
occurred and at some point the subjective probability attached to this event reaches zero. This paper 
tests whether there is evidence of disaster myopia during the recent episode of financial crisis in the 
banking sector.  
The financial crisis of 2007 is generally attributed to a number of factors associated with the 
housing and credit markets. Macroeconomic factors such as monetary policy, international trade 
imbalances, and the lack of government regulation are as well considered to have played a role in the 
                                                           
*
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crisis. Without denying the effects of the aforementioned factors, this paper suggests that current 
financial crisis also has its roots in the disaster myopia of market participants and especially banks. 
Disaster myopia has been used to explain the LDC debt crisis, the US savings and loans 
debacle and various commercial property crises.
1
 Although Haldane (2009) and Herring (2008) 
interpret the recent financial crisis as a consequence of disaster myopia and argue that disaster myopia 
has been one of its predominating factors, there is no empirical test of this hypothesis. In this paper, 
we precisely empirically test whether the 2007 illiquidity shock can be considered as a myopia-
induced disaster by analyzing the (decreasing) risk perception of banks over the period preceding the 
occurrence of the crisis.  
To measure disaster myopia, we focus on risk taking dynamics. Bank risk-taking may be 
measured by several manners in the literature. First, as in Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Esty 
(1998), and Grossman and Imai (2010), among others, one can use the volatility of share prices (this 
corresponds to computing the standard deviation of monthly changes in share prices for a given year 
for each bank, which is matched up with annual data on bank liability characteristics).
2
 Three other 
measures of risk-taking from bank balance sheets are also used: the ratio of loans to total assets, the 
ratio of cash to total assets, and the rate of growth of assets. The assumption is that loans are riskier 
and less liquid—and that cash is less risky and more liquid— than other balance sheet assets, primarily 
securities. Banks with substantial contingent liabilities should have a smaller proportion of their assets 
in loans and a larger proportion of their assets in cash than limited liability banks if the risk-reducing 
incentive of contingent liability is strong. Risk-taking can also be measured by the rate at which a 
bank’s assets expand in a given year under the theory that, all other things being equal, banks that 
engage in riskier activities will grow more rapidly than banks behaving in a more conservative manner 
(Calomiris 1990, Grossman 2001, 2007).  
In this paper, we consider the maturity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets as an indicator of 
risk taking in the banking sector.
3
 Indeed, as Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Fahri and Tirole (2009, p. 
2) suggest, the current crisis “is one of wide-scale maturity mismatch”. More precisely, we look at the 
distortions in the maturities in banks’ balance sheets by considering the share of liquid assets 
compared to long term liabilities. Maturity mismatches accepted by banks make them vulnerable to 
acute liquidity risk. We focus on the banking sector as this problem was even more acute because of 
the interaction between accounting rules and prudential norms (Basel II). During economic 
                                                           
1 For example, Guttentag and Herring (1986) and Herring (1999). 
2
 This measure has several limitations. First, some banks are privately owned, and thus their shares are not 
traded. Second, even when banks are publicly traded, shares are not transacted every month, presumably because 
these shares are not especially liquid. 
3 Note here that maturity mismatch is not used in its traditional sense. Chang and Velasco (1998), Goldfajn and Valdes 
(1999) and others have argued that foreign asset-liability mismatches in the East Asian economies was an “inevitable” 
consequence of international financial intermediation. See also Bird and Rajan (2001). Here, we simply consider that if banks 
perceived a low risk, they had a tendency to have a wide maturity mismatch, while when they perceived high risk on the 
market, they tended to reduce the mismatch.  
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slowdowns, default rates increase, asset prices decrease, which generates losses for banks that reduce 
their capital. Simultaneously because of prudential norms, the requirements for capital increase. 
Therefore, as capital is reduced and the need for capital is increased, there necessarily is a contraction 
in credit offer. 
In terms of methodology, we use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model as the 
study of disaster myopia refers to a dynamic process. Indeed, we study to what extent the lagged 
values of the risk taking variables influence the current value of this variable. The GMM shows first 
that risk taking in period t is influenced by risk taking in period t-1 at least, and second that there is a 
set of variables –specific to the banking sector as the size, profitability, vulnerability, but also to the 
economic and financial environment– that determine risk taking. The main result of the paper is that 
the disaster myopia hypothesis is relevant to understand the current financial crisis. Regressions 
reinforces our results as they show that risk taking increases from the mid 2000’s and as time goes on 
until the year 2007. We identify a break in 2007 and a decrease in risk taking in 2008 and 2009. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section describes the considered conceptual 
framework of disaster myopia. Section III presents the data, the methodology used to test the theory 
and justifies the choice of variables. Section IV establishes test results. Section V discusses the policy 
implications of evidence of disaster myopia and section VI concludes.  
 
 
II. Conceptual framework: the disaster myopia hypothesis 
Guttentag and Herring
4
 analyze the decision making process of investors under uncertainty. Disaster 
myopia is a situation in which agents tend to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes. Such 
a behaviour is especially overriding for small probability events from a distant past. The authors use 
cognitive psychology
5
 to build their reasoning. According to this approach, economic agents base their 
decisions rules on rough heuristic or rules of thumb. The closest conceptual approach is that of 
Herring (1998); in this section, we present a simplified and slightly modified version of it. We first 
describe the context, before presenting the disaster myopia hypothesis and the institutional factors that 
may give rise to such a behavior. This framework enables us to state our tested hypotheses. 
 
2.1. Uncertainty, objective and subjective risk probabilities 
In an uncertain environment, individuals use subjective probabilities. A subjective probability is a 
personal judgment concerning the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular event. Individuals do not 
use precise computation but base their judgment on a reasonable assessment. A person's subjective 
                                                           
4 See Guttentag and Herring (1984, 1986), Herring (1998, 1999) and Herring and Wachter (2002). 
5 It is well-established in cognitive psychology that economic agents have a tendency to base decision rules around rough 
heuristics or rules of thumb. For experimental evidence, see Kahneman et al. (1982). 
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probability of an event describes his/her degree of belief in the event. There is no formal calculation, 
but past experiences are very important to form these probabilities. At the opposite, objective 
probabilities estimate the occurrence of an event based on a recorded observation, rather than a 
subjective estimate. 
On the one hand, the “availability heuristic” –which refers to the ease with which a decision 
maker can imagine that an event will occur– rests on the fact that the longer the period since an event 
occurred, the lower the subjective probability attached to it. 
On the other hand, below a certain threshold, this subjective probability sets at zero. This is 
the “threshold heuristic”: it exacerbates the bias toward the underestimation of shock probabilities. 
More precisely, threshold heuristic is the rule of thumb by which decision markers devote scarce 
management time to analyze these probabilities. 
 
2.2. Disaster myopia 
The ease with which a decision maker can imagine that an event will occur rests on the fact that the 
longer the period since an event occurred, the lower the subjective probability attached to it (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. The disaster myopia hypothesis  
 
Source: adapted from Herring (1998). 
 
If the period without major shocks is sufficiently long, then subjective probabilities are validated over 
time and converge toward fully-rational objective probabilities. In such an environment, investors 
completely disregard information, they have a strong risk appetite since they believe that the 
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probability that a major negative shock
6
 occur is near zero. We may enter a phase of ‘risk indigestion’ 
(Allegret and Cornand, 2011): a crisis occurs and subjective probabilities start to be very high again, 
higher than the objective ones. As noted by Haldane (2009, p. 6), ‘it is perhaps no coincidence that the 
last three truly systemic crises – October 1987, August 1998, and the credit crunch which commenced 
in 2007 – were roughly separated by a decade. Perhaps ten years is the threshold heuristic for risk 
managers’. 
 
2.3. Institutional factors 
According to Herring (2008), institutional factors from the “Golden Decade” –the period referring to 
the years from 1998 to 2007– encouraged disaster myopia during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
First, managerial accounting systems favour activities subject to low-frequency losses. Many 
risk management models developed within the private sector during the Golden Decade could have 
induced disaster myopia. According to Haldane (2009), these models were often data hungry, 
improvements in data and IT technology feeding them with vast, high-frequency datasets, providing 
ample degrees of freedom for modellers, enabling them to devise risk frameworks which were very 
precisely calibrated in-sample. ‘The sample in question was, with hindsight, most unusual from a 
macroeconomic perspective. The distribution of outcomes for both macroeconomic and financial 
variables during the Golden Decade differed very materially from historical distribution’ (Haldane, 
2009, p. 7).  
Second, underestimation of risk has consequences for the risks facing both individual firms 
and for the system as a whole. For the system as a whole, one way of illustrating the consequences of 
underestimating risk is to translate it into “fair value” insurance premia. Haldane (2009, p. 9) 
illustrates risk under pricing on a dramatic scale: ‘The degree of under-pricing of risk is large and is 
larger for options designed to protect against tail risks (lower strike prices). For at-the-money options 
on UK equities, the insurance premium would have been under-priced by around 45%; for options 
well out-of-the-money –say, 50% below equity prices at the time– the mis-pricing would have been 
nearer 90%’.  
Among the other institutional factors mentioned by Herring (2008), we can find: the 
recognition of fees upfront as income, the bonuses tied to current revenues, the high job mobility 
among risk takers, the intense competition in financial markets that drives out participants who are not 
disaster myopic and the appearance of high profitability attracting new entrants. For more details, see 
Herring (2002) who already identified these institutional factors as a potential source of disaster 
myopia. 
                                                           
6 This negative shock may even be endogenous, attributed to their own risky behaviour that increases the fragility of the 
system. 
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2.4. Hypotheses to be tested: disaster myopia in the banking sector 
It is particularly relevant to identify bank’s myopia not only because the banking sector was at the core 
of the recent financial disaster but also because exposures in this sector grow so large that they can 
jeopardize the financial system (for systemic risk analysis during the 2007 financial crisis, see for 
instance Bullard et al. (2009)). Identifying and limiting the impact of the banking sector’s disaster 
myopia is helpful to limit consequences for the system as a whole. So based on the former conceptual 
framework, we propose to test the following two hypotheses: 
(i) the influence of the macroeconomic and financial context on the one hand and banking sector 
related financial variables on the other hand on banks’ risk taking dynamics; 
(ii) the existence of disaster myopia in the banking sector during the recent financial crisis. 
 
 
III. Testing the disaster myopia hypothesis: the empirical model 
This section presents the database constructed owing to Bankscope, IFS and OECD data. Our study is 
based on a sample of 7,360 banks from 151 countries over the period 2002-2009. After describing the 
methodology used to test the disaster myopia hypothesis, the choice of macroeconomic and banking 
variables is justified. 
 
3.1. The GMM model 
In a first time, a GMM estimator on a large sample and small periods is used in order to underline the 
dynamic of the bank risk-taking during the 2000’s. In a second step, a regression in cross-section and 
in panel focuses on the 2007 episode. Its purpose is to highlight the presence of disaster myopia 
phenomenon during the 2007 crisis. 
As the study of disaster myopia refers to a dynamic process, we must study to what extent the 
lagged values of the indicator of risk taking and the initial banking, financial and real conditions 
influence the current value of risk taking. The starting point for this analysis is a simple regression 
using the endogenous lagged variable as well as the explanatory variables in t and t-1. When the 
ordinary least squares estimator is used for this purpose, there is a problem of correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the error term due to individual effects, which then gives rise to an upward 
bias. The within estimator enables us to eliminate this problem by integrating fixed effects and allows 
us to take into account institutions specificities. Nevertheless, in the context of our analysis, there is a 
limited number of periods, which produces a significant correlation between the dependent lagged 
variable and the error term. Therefore, the use of this estimator is also biased, but in the opposite 
direction. Given the problems encountered by these two methods, it is advisable to use a dynamic 
model allowing for the introduction of instrumental variables. These variables are correlated to the 
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lagged value of the endogenous variable and not with the error term of the model (for t =2, 3, …, T), 
which solves our problem. The effects of the explanatory exogenous variables on the explained 
variable can then be interpreted (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Hence, the GMM seems to be the best 
adapted method for our estimation. It should be noted that Blundell and Bond’s (1998) Monte Carlo 
simulations showed that the system GMM estimator is more efficient than the first-differenced one. 
Indeed when the number of instruments is small and when there is a finite sample, the first-differenced 
GMM estimator is biased. It should also be noted that in order to validate the use of a GMM model, 
the estimated coefficient of the dependent lagged variable must be larger than that of the within 
estimator and smaller than that of the OLS estimator. Our model can be written as follows: 
                                            tii
n
t
ntititi vuXyy ,
0
,1,, +++= ∑
=
−−
βα                                  
with i = 1,…, 7,360 , and t = 2002, …, 2009, where 1, −tiy  represents the dependent lagged variable for 
each institution in the period t-1, ntiX −,  the set of explanatory lagged variables, iu  the specific 
individual effect for each institution, tiv ,  the specific shock at each period and on each institution and 
where ( )[ ] 0,, =+ tiiti vuxE . 
 
3.2. Data and justification of the choice of variables 
The dependent variable is a measure of risk taking defined by the ratio:  
.
)(
)(
USDthousandfundingstermshortsliabilitietotal
USDthousandassetsliquid
risk
−
=
 
Taking the risk variable one and more periods lagged enables us to show the persistence of risk taking 
over time. 
Concerning the explanatory variables, we distinguish between the banking sector and other 
macro variables, which are described in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Synthesis and definition of the model’s explanatory variables. 
Explanatory 
variable 
Definition Expected 
Sign 
Role of the variable 
Global financial and macroeconomic variables (by countries) 
prices Collateral - 
Housing price 
growth rate  
(+) Housing prices growth. 
Rational bubbles may explain deviations from the 
fundamentals and the existence of risk dynamics (Blanchard 
and Watson, 1983). 
vol Realized 
volatility of 
the Stock 
exchange 
index
i
 
(-) Volatility. 
Low volatilities may increase incentives for banks to take on 
more risk for behavioral, contractual or institutional reasons 
(Brunnermeier, 2001, Rajan, 2005). 
gdp GDP growth 
rate 
(+) Economic growth. 
According to the ‘paradox of tranquillity’ (Minsky, 1982), the 
fragilities were masked by the success of the economy and the 
economic agents benefit from new growth opportunities. 
intrate Monetary 
market rate 
(-) Monetary policy. 
Low interest rates may influence bank risk-taking (Adrian and 
Shin, 2009a, b, Borio and Zhu, 2008). 
region Dummy 
variable  
(+) =1 for industrialized countries. 
Risk taking dynamics may be more pronounced for 
industrialized countries which have benefited from emerging 
markets’ current account surpluses (Bernanke, 2005).  
Specific banking related variables (by banks) 
totkt Total capital 
ratio 
(-) Prudential. 
Bank of International Settlements 
roae Return on 
average equity 
(+) Return. 
High returns may encourage banks to hold equities (Young et 
al., 2010). 
netincome
ii
 Net income 
USD 
(+/-) Size.  
+ Too big to fail: big banks’ moral hazard induces them to 
take on more risk as they believe in the implicit guarantee of 
governments or institutions (Kay (2009), Barrell et al. (2010)).  
- Smaller banks have more risky balance sheets (Kashyap and 
Stein, 2000).  Small banks are pushed towards higher risk-
taking due to fiercer competition (Hakenes and Schnabel, 
2005). 
npl Non-
performing 
loans 
(Impaired 
Loans (NPLs)/ 
Gross Loans 
%) 
(+/-) Vulnerability, credit risk 
The mortgage expansion is accompanied by an increase in 
NPLs masked by the house prices growth (Claessens et al., 
2010).  
marketkp Market 
capitalisation / 
shareholders 
funds 
(+/-) Market concentration. 
Bank risk-taking increases as bank shareholders’ power rises 
in corporate governance (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
 
i. The annual realized volatility is measured by the standard error of the daily returns for each month and thus for each year. The realized 
volatility is well adapted in the case of high-frequency data. It is an ex-post nonparametric and unbiased volatility estimator (Andersen et al., 
2006, 2009) and represents an unbiased indicator that makes it possible to get close to the true volatility and is largely accepted in the asset 
price volatility modeling and forecasting literature (Chan et al., 2009). 
ii. The Netincome variable is taken in logarithm. 
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IV. Results 
For the period 2002-2009, the dependent variable perfectly fits with the previous model as testified by 
the following graphs presented on Figure 2: risk taking decreases in the years following a crisis and 
increases over time, until reaching the next crisis. 
 
Figure 2. Risk taking over time (2002-2010) 
                     
                         Total risk for all banks of all countries                             Banks’ average risk in the USA 
4.1. The GMM estimation over the period 2002-2009 
Table 2 presents the GMM system estimation. Different estimations of the same model (OLS, Within-
group and GMM difference) are reported in Appendix B.  
The panel is unbalanced in the sense that we have more observations on some banks than on 
others. The OLS and the Within-group estimators are biased in opposite direction but the use of the 
GMM estimation is validated because the coefficient of the estimated lagged dependent variable is 
higher than that of the Within-group estimator and lower than that of the OLS estimator. In all cases, 
the Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions validate the instruments used in the model. 
Furthermore, the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests do not reject the assumption of the absence of second 
order autocorrelation on the residuals. This study therefore enables us to interpret the estimation's 
results correctly. Time dummies are included in order to support the assumption that there is no 
correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances. For the dependent endogenous 
variables lag 2 and deeper are used. The other variables are considered as endogenous and 
instrumented with lag 2 and deeper except for the time and region dummies that are taken as 
exogenous.  
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Table 2. GMM system results 
  
GMM 
Syst 
GMM 
Syst 
GMM 
Syst 
GMM 
Syst 
GMM 
Syst 
GMM 
Syst 
GMM 
Syst 
                
L.risk 0.769*** 0.822*** 0.698*** 0.658*** 0.823*** 0.61*** 0.582*** 
  [0.102] [0.057] [0.061] [0.054] [0.062] [0.062] [0.074] 
L2.risk       0.169*** 0.040 0.15*** -0.0063 
        [0.052] [0.075] [0.054] [0.069] 
L3.risk           -0.0194 0.0958** 
            [0.037] [0.043] 
Totkt     -0.00144* -0.0002   -0.0008   
      [0.0008] [0.0006]   [0.002]   
Roae           -0.03***   
            [0.011]   
Npl 0.012 -0.001         0.00355** 
  [0.021] [0.003]         [0.002] 
Prices 0.012*             
  [0.006]             
Gdp   0.028*** -0.00119 0.026 0.039*** -0.0172   
    [0.009] [0.025] [0.025] [0.008] [0.0132]   
L.gdp         0.001     
          [0.010]     
log.netincome -0.050 -0.037* -0.115* -0.129** -0.053   0.0226 
  [0.030] [0.019] [0.062] [0.055] [0.039]   [0.017] 
L.log.netincome         -0.007     
          [0.025]     
Vol -0.876 -1.608*   5.299 -4.724***     
  [1.821] [0.828]   [3.271] [1.211]     
L.vol         4.103***     
          [0.632]     
Marketcapitalisation             0.0867** 
              [0.040] 
Intrate   0.002 0.00513 0.034 0.024** -0.0103 -0.00531 
    [0.006] [0.017] [0.020] [0.011] [0.0169] [0.008] 
L.intrate         -0.029**     
          [0.012]     
Region     0.0308 0.436*       
      [0.177] [0.240]       
Constant 0.735* 0.315 0.754** 0.032 0.633*** 0.78*** -0.262 
  [0.418] [0.192] [0.309] [0.405] [0.241] [0.230] [0.194] 
                
Observations 3361 3907 7777 6142 8540 5834 931 
Number of t 651 661 1749 1566 1532 1726 219 
Hansen statistic 41.32 79.40 18.49 6.316 123.1 23.82 91.80 
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.288 0.215 0.238 0.851 0,123 0.161 0.238 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 0.00314 -0.502 1.407 -0.280 0.634 -0.123 0.776 
p-value AR2 0.997 0.616 0.160 0.780 0.526 0.902 0.438 
Standard errors in brackets               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 The table shows different signs for different lags, we take the sum of coefficients to determine the overall sign.  
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After checking the validity of our estimations, we can now state our results. First, we observe 
that risk taking in period t is influenced by risk taking in period t-1, t-2, but not always in t-3. Risk 
taking in period t is affected by overall risk taking in the three previous years (in table 2 the sum of the 
coefficients L.risk, L2.risk, L3.risk is positive and significant).  The closer we get to period t, the 
higher the influence of the former period risk taking. 
Second, as explained above, we control the analysis for the following variables: volatility, 
housing prices, economic growth, industrialized vs. developing countries, non-performing loans, net 
income of banks, return on average equity, return on average asset, and prudential ratio.  
On the one hand, our results underline the influence of the economic and financial context on 
banks’ risk taking. We observe that the lower the volatility in period t, the higher is risk taking in 
period t (and t, t-1) (vol). The rationale for such result is that when volatility is low, banks are incited 
to take on more risks which increases the share of short term assets (dependent variable denominator). 
Hence our results are in line with the theoretical analysis of Brunnermeier (2001) and Rajan (2005). 
The procyclical behavior of volatilities is a concrete manifestation of the influence on risk perceptions. 
By contrast, the stronger growth, the higher is risk taking (gdp): as output grows there are more yield 
opportunities and economic agents search for new investment opportunities. Controlling for housing 
prices, we also observe a positive relationship: as housing prices rise, risk taking increases (prices). 
This demonstrates that economic agents and financial institutions try to benefit from a bubble, as 
suggested by the rational bubbles phenomenon of Blanchard and Watson (1983). According to them, 
rational bubbles may yield multiple equilibria that can explain deviations from the fundamentals and 
the existence of self-sustaining dynamics. Comparing industrialized to developing countries, we 
observe that risk taking is higher in the former (region). One interpretation might be that emerging 
countries have drawn the lessons from previous crises, especially owing to prudential policies 
implemented in these countries, such as controlling entrance of short term capital inflows and 
managing the illiquidity risk in the banking sector. Another prominent view (Bernanke (2005)) is that 
an excess of saving over investment in emerging market countries, eased financial conditions and 
exerted significant downward pressure on world interest rates. In so doing, this flow of saving helped 
to fuel a credit boom and risk-taking in major advanced economies, particularly in the United States. 
Over the long run (t, t-1), low interest rates generate high risk taking. The idea is to consider that 
monetary policy could have contributed to the crisis. Low interest rates affect valuations, incomes and 
cash flows, which in turn can influence how banks measure risk (Adrian and Shin, 2009a, b, Borio and 
Zhu, 2008). Lower interest rates, for instance, boost asset and collateral values as well as incomes and 
profits, which in turn can reduce risk perceptions and/or increase risk tolerance. In this respect our 
results converge toward those of Altunbas et al. (2010) who empirically analyze the relationship 
between monetary policy and risk-taking by banks using a sample of 1,100 European and US banks. 
They find evidence that relative changes in banks’ risk-attitude (i.e. comparing risky versus less risky 
12 
 
banks as perceived by the market) are linked to monetary policy even in a period of subdued risk 
perception. More precisely, unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to 
an increase in bank’ risk.  
On the other hand, the specific bank variables play a role in the risk taking dynamics.  At the 
banks’ scale, the higher net income, the lower is risk taking (netincome). This result underlines the fact 
that smaller banks are induced to take more risk. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 
those banks hold less liabilities compared to bigger ones, and so the share of short term assets 
relatively to long term liabilities is smaller. Indeed, smaller banks generally have less liquid balance 
sheets (lower ratios of securities to assets) (Kashyap et al. (2000)). The lower the return (roae for 
return on average equity and), the higher is risk taking, indicating that banks search for yield. Low 
returns on investments, such as government (risk-free) securities, may increase incentives for banks to 
take on more risk to meet a nominal return target (Young et al., 2010). The higher market 
capitalization (marketkp), the higher is risk taking. The more banks’ capitalization is concentrated, the 
more banks take risks. Indeed, the less a bank has shareholders, the more risks it takes; such a 
behavior can be associated with a specific management mode of slightly capitalized banks. According 
to Laeven and Levine (2009), bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of 
shareholders within the corporate governance structure of banks. Finally, the higher prudential 
ratio, the lower is risk taking (totcap), which suggests that macro-policy tends to reduce risk on a 
global basis. Finally, the lower the amount of non-performing loans, the higher should be risk taking, 
indicating that banks’ vulnerability tends to reduce maturity mismatch (npl). The mortgage expansion 
is accompanied by an increase in NPLs masked by the house prices growth (Claessens et al. (2010)).  
This variable is only significant for the GMM system. We cannot therefore make a definitive 
conclusion.   
 
4.2. Testing the disaster myopia hypothesis: the particular case of 2007 and previous years 
To test the disaster myopia hypothesis, we resort to two types of estimations: cross-section and cross-
section with country dummies. We consider two periods of time: starting from 2009 backward and 
starting from 2007 backward. We observe that results converge for any of the two methods (Tables 3 
and 4). 
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Table 3. Dynamics of risk taking during the recent crisis (OLS) 
Variables risk2009 risk2009 risk2009 risk2009 risk2009 risk2007 risk2007 risk2007 risk2007 
risk2008 0.757*** 0.757*** 0.770*** 0.766*** 0.766***         
  [51.11] [51.08] [51.72] [51.24] [50.75]         
risk2007 -0.013 -0.002 -0.029 -0.020 -0.021         
  [-0.802] [-0.0695] [-1.329] [-0.891] [-0.919]         
risk2006   -0.013 -0.120*** -0.132*** -0.132***  0.857*** 0.626*** 0.643*** 0.643*** 
    [-0.795] [-4.662] [-5.070] [-5.051] [63.10] [24.46] [24.97] [24.96] 
risk2005     0.144*** 0.077** 0.078**   0.283*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 
      [5.257] [2.188] [2.200]   [9.660] [10.87] [10.86] 
risk2004       0.082*** 0.091**     -0.16*** -0.14*** 
        [2.978] [2.415]     [-5.316] [-3.550] 
risk2003         -0.010       -0.015 
          [-0.340]       [-0.496] 
Constant 0.329*** 0.331*** 0.304*** 0.292*** 0.293*** 0.257*** 0.193*** 0.214*** 0.215*** 
  [13.33] [13.31] [11.92] [11.32] [11.31] [9.57] [7.001] [7.730] [7.747] 
Obs. 3027 3023 2999 2986 2981 872 3003 2990 2985 
R-squared 0.761 0.761 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.741 0.748 0.749 0.749 
t-statistics in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
 
Table 4. Dynamics of risk taking during the recent crisis (Country dummies) 
Variables risk2009 risk2009 risk2009 risk2009 risk2009 risk2007 risk2007 risk2007 risk2007 
risk2008 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.771*** 0.767*** 0.767***         
  [50.05] [50.00] [50.61] [50.14] [49.59]         
risk2007 -0.026 -0.024 -0.050** -0.041* -0.041*         
  [-1.558] [-1.050] [-2.184] [-1.756] [-1.760]         
risk2006   -0.002 -0.104*** -0.116*** -0.116*** 0.854*** 0.641*** 0.656*** 0.657*** 
    [-0.147] [-3.932] [-4.333] [-4.319] [92.55] [24.77] [25.26] [25.25] 
risk2005     0.135*** 0.069* 0.069*   0.260*** 0.383*** 0.385*** 
      [4.859] [1.911] [1.910]   [8.789] [10.08] [10.09] 
risk2004       0.082*** 0.085**     -0.155*** -0.138*** 
        [2.896] [2.231]     [-5.162] [-3.375] 
risk2003         -0.004       -0.019 
          [-0.144]       [-0.613] 
Constant -0.079 -0.078 -0.133 -0.156 -0.156 0.221 0.217 0.293 0.299 
  [-0.0948] [-0.0938] [-0.161] [-0.188] [-0.188] [0.246] [0.243] [0.330] [0.336] 
Obs. 3015 3011 2987 2974 2969 3016 2991 2978 2973 
R-squared 0.770 0.770 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.758 0.762 0.764 0.764 
t-statistics in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
For the period from 2002 to 2009, we observe that banks’ risk taking in 2009 is positively influenced 
by their risk taking in 2008 and negatively by their risk taking in 2006 (coefficients are stable from 
regression to the next). There is therefore a break in risk taking due to the negative shock that 
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occurred in 2007. The lower risk taking in 2008 induced also a lower risk taking in 2009. By 
comparison, for the period from 2002 to 2007, we observe that the influence of risk taking is 
increasing over time starting from 2004.  
 We can thus conclude that the episode of the 2007 crisis shows evidence of banks’ myopia 
disaster. This result is in accordance with the aforementioned GMM results. 
 
 
V. Discussion about policy implications 
As regulators and institutions are more immune to disaster myopia
7
, they must design stress 
scenarios integrating extreme events and impose them to financial institutions. Regulators must also 
consider more deeply models used by financial institutions, in particular the historical statistics 
series used to estimate risks. All this can be done via prudential supervision accompanied by 
measures of transparency. 
 
5.1. Prudential supervision 
Preventing the development of financial conditions that are vulnerable to crisis is the role of prudential 
supervision. More precisely, prudential supervision should help identify vulnerable banks before they 
become weak banks and especially banks that are becoming heavily exposed to a major shock. The 
recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision go in this direction. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter BCBS) (2009a), stress 
tests should be performed for different risk types including market, credit, operational and liquidity 
risk. According to Haldane (2009), the evaluation of the degree of risk –the value at risk for the private 
sector and the stress-tests for the public one– was based on data and assumptions relative to the 
Golden Era. This period is characterized by a strikingly low volatility from an historical perspective 
inducing a low degree of risk that conduced to disaster myopia. Using British historical data –back in 
some cases to the 17
th
 century– Haldane shows that the low macroeconomic and financial volatility 
level during this Golden Era has been without historical equivalent. As a result, this lack of historical 
perspective to assess the risk level has led to disaster myopia. According to Haldane (2009), ‘the 
stress-tests required by the authorities over the past few years were too heavily influenced by 
behaviour during the Golden Decade’.Therefore, as required by the BCBS, a bank should enhance its 
stress testing practices by considering important interrelations between various factors, including: (i) 
price shocks for specific asset categories; (ii) the drying-up of corresponding asset liquidity; (iii) the 
                                                           
7 Identifying whether there is or not a difference between the private sector and the official sector in terms of disaster myopia 
is another issue that is not dealt with in this paper. Haldane (2009) stresses that both the private and the public sectors suffer 
from a disaster myopia behavior.  
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possibility of significant losses damaging the bank’s financial strength; (iv) growth of liquidity needs 
as a consequence of liquidity commitments; (v) taking on board affected assets; and (vi) diminished 
access to secured or unsecured funding markets. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b and 2009c) also made a few 
propositions aiming at limiting banks’ risk by establishing some ratios. Both the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio and the 3et Stable Funding Ratio proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
intend to limit risk. The liquidity coverage ratio is also useful in this respect, as it identifies the amount 
of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets an institution holds that can be used to offset the net cash 
outflows it would encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario specified by supervisors. The 
net stable funding ratio measures the amount of longer-term, stable sources of funding employed by an 
institution relative to the liquidity profiles of the assets funded and the potential for contingent calls on 
funding liquidity arising from off-balance sheet commitments and obligations. The standard requires a 
minimum amount of funding that is expected to be stable over a one year time horizon based on 
liquidity risk factors assigned to assets and off-balance sheet liquidity exposures. This ratio is intended 
to promote longer-term structural funding of banks’ balance sheets, off-balance sheet exposures and 
capital markets activities. To deal with banks’ liquidity risk, the Committee also proposes that banks 
should frequently conduct a contractual maturity mismatch assessment. 
 
5.2. Announcements and transparency 
In parallel, policy-makers may attempt to avert a financial crisis by announcing policies that will 
reduce the likelihood of a disaster or mitigate its impact. For example, the development of indicators 
of increasing vulnerability to financial crises could provide a useful counter to disaster myopia. 
Macroprudential indicators may help deter disaster myopia. 
Factors that encourage disaster myopia should also be dealt with. Opaque accounting 
practices, which obscure the magnitude of the exposure of the consolidated financial institution or 
mask deterioration in the market value of exposures, are a fundamental source of vulnerability. Ex-
ante public disclosure of exposures to credit risk may exercise some constraining influence. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it shows that the 2007 financial crisis exhibits disaster 
myopia in the banking sector. Disaster myopia suggests that competitive, incentive-based and 
psychological mechanisms in the presence of uncertainty lead financial institutions to underestimate 
the risk of financial instability. Second, this paper identifies macro and specific determinant variables 
in banks’ risk taking since the beginning of the years 2000. The recognition of conditions that promote 
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disaster myopia is the starting point. In terms of economic policy, there is a need for advances in 
modelling credit risk and greater discipline of the pricing of credit risk. Identifying and limiting the 
impact of the banking sector’s disaster myopia is helpful as it may limit the consequences for the 
system as a whole. Indeed, because of the particular and systemic role of banks in the financing of the 
economy, the impact of banking sector myopia on the economy may grow so large that they can 
jeopardize the financial system. 
An open question for future research is whether disaster myopia is more prominent during the 
recent financial crisis than during previous financial distresses. More precisely, is the current financial 
crisis special in this respect? We expect the disaster myopia problem to be more acute today because 
of the complexity and opacity of new financial products. 
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Appendix 
 
A – Summary 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
intrate 52152 2.707955 2.968118 .0008508 86.0976 
gdp 57336 1.838918 2.62559 -17.955 27.3205 
Risk 24311 -.160716 .611732 -5.274448 1.926958 
Vol 50787 .0669429 .7020496 .0032289 20.99577 
prices 42798 2.570203 4.841805 -11.21511 19.26538 
Totkt 10850 20.93146 44.11118 .01 982.6001 
Roae 22111 12.10005 21.22037 .004 850.2368 
marketkp 3740 2.368776 21.30123 .001 783.3738 
netincome 22124 3.947497 .9159321 .8086932 7.394924 
npl 7247 4.645931 10.32534 0 228.7 
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B – Different estimations of the same model (OLS, Within-group and GMM difference)  
Table 6. GMM difference results 
  GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff 
                
L.risk 0.625*** 0.591*** 0.580*** 0.487*** 0.567*** 0.591*** 0.257*** 
  [0.082] [0.064] [0.0685] [0.074] [0.062] [0.110] [0.024] 
L2.risk       0.141** 0.039 0.106* -0.00726 
        [0.056] [0.033] [0.0570] [0.016] 
L3.risk           -0.0409 0.0689*** 
            [0.0465] [0.015] 
totkt     0.00612 -0.000   0.0140   
      [0.00542] [0.004]   [0.0119]   
roae           -0.0340***   
            [0.0100]   
npl -0.018*** -0.009***         -0.00120 
  [0.005] [0.003]         [0.002] 
prices 0.011*             
  [0.006]             
gdp   -0.014 -0.00788 0.018 0.004 -0.0187   
    [0.020] [0.0364] [0.055] [0.012] [0.0214]   
L.gdp         0.031***     
          [0.010]     
log.netincome -0.208* 0.003 -0.629*** -0.475** -0.317***   -0.0733*** 
  [0.118] [0.078] [0.204] [0.231] [0.061]   [0.025] 
L.log.netincome         0.062     
          [0.050]     
vol -2.603 -0.534   5.194 -3.666***     
  [1.883] [0.994]   [1.416] [3.667]     
L.vol         1.059     
          [0.750]     
marketcapitalisation             0.0533*** 
              [0.019] 
intrate   -0.004 -0.00804 0.040 0.031*** -0.0218 -0.00521 
    [0.008] [0.0206] [0.892] [0.044] [0.0225] [0.004] 
                
Observations 2663 3166 5799 4448 6985 3995 704 
Number of t 625 638 1506 1349 1519 1470 217 
Hansen statistic 16.66 134.7 5.660 3.519 79.55 6.004 61.18 
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.408 0.144 0.843 0.621 0.000199 0.946 0.206 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.199 0.695 1.416 -0.483 0.440 0.00424 0.709 
p-value AR2 0.842 0.974 0.157 0.629 0.660 0.997 0.478 
Standard errors in brackets 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Tables 7. OLS and panel Fixed Effects results 
  OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
                  
L.risk 0.814*** 0.326*** 0.885*** 0.419*** 0.832*** 0.301*** 0.659***  .258*** 
  [60.05] [12.86] [122.22] [26.59] [150.69] [25.35] [54.93] [18.98] 
L2.risk             0.189***  -0.0007 
              [16.19] [0.05] 
L3.risk                 
                  
totkt         0.000 -0.002*** 0.000   -0.002 
          [0.14] [3.84] [0.12] [0.68] 
roae                 
                  
npl 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000         
  [0.22] [0.12] [1.07] [0.15]         
prices 0.007 0.001             
  [1.53] [0.33]             
gdp     -0.028*** -0.031*** 0.004 0.015*** 0.001 0.013** 
      [7.34] [8.26] [1.05] [3.99] [0.24] [2.79] 
L.gdp                 
                  
log.netincome -0.007 -0.010 0.000 -0.021* -0.059*** -0.246*** -0.060***   -0.215*** 
  [0.95] [0.38] [0.04] [1.77] [6.03] [8.23] [5.88] [6.59] 
L.log.netincome                 
                  
vol 1.402*** 0.075 -0.764*** -1.126***     0.664*** 0.040 
  [2.60] [0.16] [4.04] [6.04]     [2.82] [0.19] 
L.vol                 
                  
marketcapitalisation                 
                  
intrate     0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.013*** 0,004 
      [0.75] [1.22] [0.96] [0.20] [2.70] [0,68] 
L.intrate                 
                  
region         0.015   0.113**   
          [0.43]   [2.34]   
Constant 0.103 0.875*** 0.139*** 0.637*** 0.369*** 1.827*** 0.221*** 1.734*** 
  [1.30] [3.20] [4.06] [5.27] [6.46] [14.26] [3.00] [12.25] 
                  
Observations 3361 3361 3907 3907 7777 7777 6142 6142 
R-squared 0.53 0.06 0.79 0.19 0.75 0.12 0.77 0,09 
Number of t   651   661   1749   1566 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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  OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
              
L.risk 0.895*** 0.557*** 0.664*** 0.185*** 0.729*** 0.263*** 
  [77.78] [42.89] [49.69] [11.73] [25.39] [8.47] 
L2.risk 0.052*** -0.124*** 0.137*** -0.029* -0.055 -0.038 
  [4.36] [7.99] [8.74] [1.83] [1.64] [1.31] 
L3.risk     0.047*** -0.078*** 0.106*** 0.044* 
          [4.66] [1.94] 
totkt     0.000 -0.001     
      [0.25] [1.36]     
roae     -0.003*** -0.001     
      [3.57] [0.76]     
npl         0.001 0.000 
          [0.39] [0.01] 
prices             
              
gdp 0.009* 0.014* 0.002 0.020***     
  [1.75] [1.94] [0.37] [4.04]     
L.gdp 0.010 0.044***         
  [1.62] [6.13]         
log.netincome -0.061*** -0.073***     0.012** 0.012 
  [5.65] [5.60]     [2.16] [0.59] 
L.log.netincome 0.042*** 0.002         
  [3.88] [0.16]         
vol 1.826*** 1.606***         
  [7.14] [6.45]         
L.vol 0.939*** 2.216***         
  [3.11] [5.17]         
marketcapitalisation         0.022* 0.053*** 
          [1.77] [3.35] 
intrate 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.012*** -0.013** 
  [6.45] [4.92] [0.47] [0.48] [2.94] [2.37] 
L.intrate -0.069*** -0.034***         
  [8.87] [3.75]         
region             
              
Constant 0.177*** 0.981*** 0.158*** 1.059*** -0.022 0.292 
  [4.91] [6.18] [7.97] [27.69] [0.34] [1.34] 
              
Observations 8540 8540 5834 5834 931 931 
R-squared 0.79 0.24 0.75 0.04 0.81 0.14 
Number of t   1532   1726   219 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
          
 
 
